The Sahel is a hotbed of instability with multidimensional and multifactorial causes. Jean-Hervé Jezequel, deputy director of the West Africa project at International Crisis Group, in this interview explains the impact of the complicated situation in this region after the NGO’s annual report on conflict zones in the world.
Sahelien.com: On Sunday 5 March, a Malian military post underwent an attack in Boulikessi, on the border between Mali and Burkina. At the end of February, the International Crisis Group issued a report to warn the conflict zones of which the Sahel, notably Mali and Burkina Faso, are part of. First, did this attack surprise you?
Jean-Hervé Jezequel: Unfortunately, it is not a surprise for anyone who knows this region. There have been so many incidents in this area. However, the process of Algiers, which mobilizes all the attention and the energies, does not bring much answers to the disruptions that shake the center of Mali and which extend towards Burkina Faso. In fact, we had a report in July 2016 on this issue. The Malian government has for a time considered the preparation of a special plan for the center of the country. It is a complex but interesting initiative, the authorities should now associate with it the Burkinabe neighbor. The common answers are more effective, the means can be pooled.
In your report, you feel that the heart of the problem in the Sahel is the endless crisis in Mali. What characterizes this situation of instability?
Mali is one of the main centers of instability in the Sahel but the causes and forms of the Malian crisis are found among its Sahelian neighbors. For example: the weak capacity of the States to invest the territories, especially the neglected and sparsely populated rural areas; the decline, the aging and the questioning of a whole generation of political elites who no longer succeed in convincing the population, especially young people; the alarming development of armed groups of various kinds: self-defense groups, autonomist groups, transnational criminal groups, ethnic-based militias, groups claiming to be armed Jihad. The latter concerns more the media but they are only part of the problem. The roots of the discomfort are deep as you can see, there will be no miracle solution.
On 6 February, the G5 countries announced the creation of a regional force to fight terrorism. Do you think this will be an effective solution?
This is at least an interesting proposition. It is not foreign forces that have to take over the security of this area in a sustainable way. It remains to be seen whether this is a realistic solution in a context where States lack resources (border operations carried out within the framework of the G5 have been supported by the logistical support of the French force, Barkhane, for example). Some G5 armies must also reconcile with civilian populations in order to have a real impact on the ground. Finally, even if progress has been made at the level of the General Staffs, it is also necessary that the States of the region have more confidence among themselves. Each G5 State has its share of responsibility for the rise and spread of armed violence.
The report indicates that Mali’s neighbors need to pay much more attention to their internal situation. These include the low representation of certain ethnic communities, such as the Fulani in Djibo in Burkina Faso and Tillabéry in Niger….
We notice that there is sometimes a tendency to overwhelm the Malian government with all the evils that strike the region. Each state must, however, take into account local negligence situations that explain the spread of armed threats in the Sahel. Some regions (more than some communities) have been neglected by the state, communities are mobilizing to solve the problems that divide them without going through the state, which fosters the formation of various more or less controlled armed groups. Radical groups in particular know how to manipulate these situations of neglect or even abandon in order to settle, to pose as defenders of certain regions or communities and to impose their vision of society. They succeed even better when the state is discredited by its absence, its corruption or its brutality. Instead of pointing the finger at communities like the ‘Fulani’ in Mali or the Buduma in Lake Chad for their supposed empathy with jihadism, it would be better to question the absences and shortcomings of the public authorities.
What must Burkina Faso, considered to be Mali’s weakest neighbor, do to get out of the situation of insecurity in which it is, the new authorities have been unable to rebuild the intelligence system, have no defense strategy … ?
Defense and intelligence are important tools, currently being rebuilt in Burkina Faso, but it is also necessary to go beyond strictly security responses. States must reinvest the neglected areas by offering useful services to the people and restoring their function as peaceful regulators of local tensions (in particular land conflicts or rivalries over access to natural resources). Well-trained soldiers may be better off fighting radical groups but they will not eliminate the threat on their own. It is the committed educator, the available doctor and the impartial judge who will bring the populations back into the fold of the state allowing to dry up the sources of jihadist recruitment. Obviously this is easier said than done. Under the pressure of the attacks, states react by the use of force, but in Burkina Faso, as elsewhere in the Sahel, more ambitious responses are needed to prevent areas of violence from spreading.
In Mali today, many believe that the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement has lapsed. In the report you talk about the meeting that took place in Bamako around the agreement between the Malian parties and the leader of the mediation, Algeria. What has it served finally?
This high-level meeting took place in February in Bamako. It made it possible to unblock a little the situation through the installation of the interim authorities but I fear that this meeting, very fast, lacked ambition. It basically solved problems of position sharing rather than a more productive amendment of the agreement. The internationals and part of the Malian parties are afraid to consider the rewriting of the agreement of which they know the limits, they are afraid to reopen the Pandora’s box and to re-launch the violence. But the violence is already on a daily basis. Today, we must recognize the low impact of the agreement on the situation in Mali. The armed groups are more numerous than before the signing, the arms continue to circulate, the Malian and international security forces are the object of regular attacks, the control of the traffics continue to generate its share of confrontations …. The process of Algiers progresses painfully, the peace does not advance.
Could the setting up of the interim authorities and the operationalization of the MOC (mixed patrols) put the Agreement back on track?
The setting up of the interim authorities is a significant step towards clarifying the division of responsibilities and power in the north of the country. Beyond local tensions, it is also interesting to note that young Malians have been appointed to important positions (sometimes because they are the only graduates). But this remains a fragile and insufficient step. What are the powers of these interim authorities? When exactly ends this interim period which some say has just begun? What budget do these authorities have? To whom are they responsible in the use of resources? Who can punish them for abuse or mismanagement? There are so many fundamental issues to be resolved. It is true that peace is not built in one day, but 20 months to obtain the appointment of authorities with uncertain resources and powers still vague, it is a lot. The operationalization of the MOCs would involve more people in the process. It will be decisive if it opens the door to the DDR (Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration) process. But again, it took twenty months to organize a first mixed patrol and the groups remain traumatized by the bombing of Gao. The way is still long.
Boubacar Sangaré