While the new President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, is expected in Mali this Friday, the military strategy of the forces of Barkhane – which he is visiting in Gao – remains at the heart of the debates. A topic on which the French president is expected. Analysis.
This Friday, May 19, the new French president, Emmanuel Macron, is expected in Mali for a one-day visit to the French military in Gao. This travel, since the beginning of the week, is the subject of comments by the media of the two countries. In France yesterday, journalists and newspaper companies spoke up, by addressing an open letter to the president in which they protest against the management of his communication during the trip.
Two interviews with the Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who will go to Gao to welcome him … This is how the program of this trip of Emmanuel Macron to Mali looks like, the first in Africa since he took office on May 14. He will be accompanied by the Minister of the Armed Forces, Sylvie Goulard and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian. In Paris, voices have emerged to say that the new president could have passed first by N’Djamena, to greet the major general Xavier de Woillemont who commands the Barkhane Force. Under these conditions, he would be obliged to meet Idriss Deby Itno, and, for some, would be open to many critics.
This visit, as we know, takes place in a context marked in recent years by the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, to stop the advancement of the barbarian hordes of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), by Ançar Eddine. This intervention has mainly allowed Mali to continue the political process, as well as to rebuild its security forces. But the political efforts of the Malian government only paid off when the armed groups finally signed the Algiers Agreements on June 20, 2015, allowing the country to embark on military reform initiatives.
But today, according to the most shared opinion, the situation in general has improved less than hoped few months after Operation Serval, which was replaced in August 2014 by Barkhane, whose forces are destined to fight terrorists in the Sahel. In a recent report entitled « Mali’s Next Battle », published in April 2017, the California-based research organization RAND Corporation notes that « the terrorist threat is persistent, and more worrying in some ways. The political process, despite the signing of the Algiers Agreements, remains fragile and unlikely to give what Mali’s international partners expect … ».
The terrorist threat has re-emerged in Mali. Islamist fighters are active. Guerrilla attacks, improvised explosive devices and other forms of asymmetric warfare are now part of daily life in the north as well as increasingly in the center (Mopti, Segou, Koulikoro). According to the same report, it is difficult to say what is causing this increase in the level of violence: « The Jihadists may have more recruits or funds, or have simply understood how to defeat tactics of the Malian armed forces, MINUSMA as well as France. Although it is recognized that Operation Serval significantly reduced the capacity of the Islamists and the number of their fighters. The method used by Barkhane in the desert is described as « a decapitation strategy » aimed at jihadist leaders. In December 2014, French forces killed Ahmed al-Tilemsi, one of the leaders and founding members of MUJAO, as well as Oumar Ould Hamaha.
Increasingly, experts are calling into question this strategy, which would ignore the root causes of terrorism in Mali. Especially as there is growing evidence from the field work that terrorist groups are supported and colluded with communities whose motivations lie in economic and political considerations, in addition to religious ones. In a recent interview with Sahelien.com, Yvan Guichaoua, a specialist in the Sahel and security issues, explains that « despite Barkhane, the jihadist activity has not faltered. It has even intensified and spread geographically in 2016. And the year 2017 began in the worst possible way, by the horrible attack of the MOC in Gao. The change is not only quantitative or geographical, it is also qualitative: jihadists work under a more unified banner, that of The Islamic and Muslim Support Group of Iyad Ag Ghaly, (even if there is competition embodied by Abu Walid Al-Sahrawi or Malam Dicko) and make it more complex. They are obliged to adapt to the opposition that Barkhane brings them. »
An analysis that reminds us that the end of the tunnel in the Malian conflict is still far away. And to the proposal of the Malian civil society and certain political parties to negotiate with certain Malian jihadists, such as Iyad Ag Ghaly and Hammadoun Koufa, Paris opposes an objection, preferring to stick to the postulate according to which « we don’t negotiate with terrorists ». If there is a topic on which Emmanuel Macron is expected in Mali, it is this Barkhane strategy that is increasingly being discussed in a Sahel region where, in lack of solutions, the international community tries hard contain the problem, prevent it from exploding. For the Sahel has become a powder keg.
Boubacar SangaréTranslated by Mahaitou Ibrahim Maiga