Security issues come to the fore when high profile targets are hit, like the Aziz Istanbul restaurant in central Ouagadougou in August. But this concentration of attention overlooks the type of low intensity conflict that is increasingly afflicting various peripheral zones in the North of Burkina Faso, which borders Mali. The first attack in such zones dates back to April 4, 2015, when the country was ruled by a transitional council following the forced departure of president Blaise Compaoré in a popular uprising. Yes, already that long ago.
Since then the number, frequency and intensity of targeted killings and abductions has fluctuated greatly with the Cappuccino/Splendide Hotel and the Aziz Istanbul attacks as the deadliest. However, one thing remains the same: a highly unequal distribution of protection measures between the centre and the periphery. Patrols cover the expensive Kwame Nkrumah Avenue in central Ouagadougou. The Aziz Istanbul anti terror operation was conducted by a greatly evolved special unit of the Burkinabè gendarmerie. But security forces elsewhere in the country remain dangerously exposed.
In December 2016, an attack on the army near Nassoumbou, in the troubled Soum province, killed 12 soldiers. That attack was claimed by Ansarul Islam, a particularly noxious group led by the radicalised preacher Ibrahim Malam Dicko and most probably the action that prompted Opération Panga, in the spring of 2017. The operation managed to dislodge Ansarul Islam elements from the Djibo area where it had been attacking schools, moderate imams, gendarmes and local authorities. However, any illusion that terrorists had been dealt a severe blow were soon put paid to.
While the number of attacks averaged two per month between April and July, since August that frequency has more than doubled. August 17, 2017: just four days after the Aziz Istanbul attack, an army vehicle on a routine patrol hits an IED at Touranata, 18 km from Djibo, Soum province. It is the first time such a device has been used in Burkina Faso. Three soldiers die. In and around Djibo and the town of Gorom-Gorom, capital of neighbouring Oudalan province, several terrorist-related incidents are reported. Then comes September, the worst month so far.
September 1, attack on the gendarmerie of Djibasso, Kossi province, one dead. September 4: two people kidnapped in Kourfadji, Soum province. September 7: attack against the office of Diguel’s mayor, again in Soum Province. September 15: a village chief, a marabout and one other person assassinated, also in Soum Province. September 17, a village chief is killed in Tem, Soum province. September 23, four soldiers wounded as their vehicle hits another IED, just south of Djibo. Unconfirmed reports talk about a gendarme post being ransacked in Mentao refugee camp, just south of Djibo, on the same day.
It is in zones like these that the war against self-declared jihadists will be won or lost. This takes various forms, including military action if needed – but clearly these groups behave like water: stop them somewhere and they’ll go somewhere else. Opération Panga, carried out in collaboration with the Malian army and the French anti-terrorist operation Barkhane, was part of that effort but has failed to prevent similar atrocities, particularly in the North but also the latest abomination in Ouagadougou. If September is any indication, Burkina Faso’s security forces are losing their control of parts of the North. Neither is the army doing itself any favours, in spite of its generally good reputation: if what a recent Human Rights Watch report says is true, then the Burkina Faso and Mali armies stand accused of having committed excesses on Malian territory in the aftermath of Operation Panga. In the Djibo area, local people also complain about the security forces’ harsh interrogation methods.
Additional budget has been made available to combat the security problem. L’Économiste du Faso of September 11 mentions a extra sum of of CFA1,455bn. Out of that money, CFA500m would be reserved for an anti-terrorism fund (but its contents are unclear) and the other CFA955m for the acquisition of material for the security forces. Progress on the spending of these extra funds is slow, says Security minister Simon Compaoré, because the relevant files are still awaiting release from the Ministry of Finance.
Compaoré always seemed an unlikely candidate for the job of Security chief. The former mayor of Ouagadougou and prominent political operator for the fallen government of Blaise Compaoré, the minister attained his post by virtue of his prominent role in founding the breakaway party MPP (Mouvement de peuple pour le progrès), which dealt a heavy blow to Blaise Compaoré’s presidency. He has come under repeated criticism for his alleged ineffectiveness but of late he seems to have grown in stature and not just for his well-worn habit of hugging the media. This is due, no doubt, to the extra money he has managed to secure but also because he saw his unmanageable Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security split in two with him retaining the latter half. More impetus has come from the appointment of Jean-Clause Bouda, a protégé of president Kaboré, at the helm of the Ministry of Defense. Competition, as they say, is healthy.
And how is morale on the ground? Do the men and women in uniform get paid proper salaries? The bimonthly publication Mutations of September 1 paints a bleak picture of a divided army led by long-established officers and a demoralised rank-and-file. Daily allowances for those sent to the danger zones are risible: CFA1,500 for a policeman; the same amount plus another CFA1,000 (nicknamed “cigarette allowance”) for a soldier. Arms, munitions and logistical means are said to be in poor state. The gendarme stations that are dotted along the border are old, frequently dilapidated, unprotected (except for small sandsack walls) and therefore vulnerable to attack.
In an online post by the blogger and activist Harouna Dabré, who publishes under the pseudonym of Lenga Fils (http://netafrique.net/situation-securitaire-au-burkina-faso-ne-rien-faire-est-suicidaire-monsieur-le-president-du-faso/) told the world that morale at the FDS (Forces de défense et de sécurité) was indeed very low, following the multiple deaths at the hand of a barely visible enemy, a dearth of material and too few boots on the ground. His article was a thinly disguised plea for the removal of Security minister Compaoré and a very explicit plea for the re-introduction of uniforms into the cabinet, against the December 2016 promise of freshly elected president Kaboré that he would not allow the military back into his cabinet.
Whatever the politicians say, do or decide, the effects of a truly beefed up security effort will have to be felt not only on the Kwame Nkrumah Avenue, where the rich go to eat and be entertained. More importantly, these effects must be felt in the poor and marginalised zones of the country, where, in the words of human rights activist Chrysogone Zoungrana the security of entire villages is assured by fewer unformed personnel than that of a single minister’s villa in the capital. Every research into the question of why young men join armed groups reveal three main motives: marginalisation, lack of perspective and impunity. Northern Burkina Faso fits all three descriptions to perfection. Extra security will increase levels of safety, certainly. But it will not address any of the three core issues. That will require long-term investment in jobs, infrastructure, education, health care and most of all: an investment into people’s sense that they belong to the same country as those who dine on the terraces of downtown Ouagadouogu.
Bram Posthumus