Ibrahim Maïga is a researcher at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS, based in Dakar), an organization that works to strengthen human security on the African continent. He is in charge of the Sahel, especially Mali where he is based. What can we expect from the G5 force in the Sahel region, which has become a sanctuary of instability because of violent extremism and trafficking? Especially since this force is already deprived of the financial and political support of the United States and Great Britain, who went as far as refusing the Security Council to adopt a resolution for its deployment. He answers questions from Sahelien.com.
Sahelien.com: The European Union, at the meeting of the ministers of the G5 Sahel countries on Tuesday June 6, decided to participate in the financing of the force to up to 50 million Euro. Don’t you think that this would give the EU the latitude to impose guidelines on this organization?
Ibrahim Maïga: It should be remembered that the budget of the G5 Sahel Force (FC-G5S) is estimated at 600 million dollars. So the EU contribution, although significant, actually represents only 10-15% of the needs. The EU, in particular some of its members, has other means of influence which are not limited to this financial support for the operationalization of the FC-G5S. On the other hand, the G5, like most recipients of international aid, also has the means to resist pressure if it so wishes. What is to be hoped for is that this process continues to be carried out by the countries of the region, taking into account the concerns of the populations.
Sahelien.com: The force will consist of 10,000 men. Do you think that is enough to fight effectively against violent extremists and trafficking in the Sahel?
Ibrahim Maïga: The mandate of the FC-G5S focuses on four areas, including combating terrorism and trafficking, contributing to the restoration of State authority, facilitating humanitarian assistance and contribution to the implementation of development actions. It is on the basis of the resources deployed to operationalize these axes that it will be possible to judge the ability of the FC-G5S to respond to these challenges. This answer, though necessary, will not be sufficient. Emphasis should also be placed on understanding the issues. For example, on the issue of trafficking in the Sahel, it is necessary to distinguish between those related licit goods and illicit goods. Tackling the former without offering real alternatives to the populations, especially the border populations that live on it is to take the risk of breaking a balance with unpredictable consequences on the stability of countries. The latter are not at all difficult to fight because they often involve complicity in the structures of the concerned countries and that any fight is difficult in the absence of any real political will. All this is to say that no matter how many troops, military response alone will not be able to effectively combat violent extremism and trafficking in the Sahel in the absence of structural reforms to address the root causes of these phenomena.
Sahelien.com: Without Algeria, which is a regional military power, will this force be effective?
Ibrahim Maïga: Although it is a regional power because of its logistical, material and financial capacities, Algerian military doctrine does not allow this country to consider a military engagement of Algeria beyond its national borders. This congenital blockage is one of the reasons for the failure of the CEMOC and more broadly one of the limitations to Algerian capacity for influence.
Sahelien.com: What do you think of Mali, considered as the soft belly of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, taking the lead of the G5 force?
Ibrahim Maïga: Mali is considered the epicenter of sahelian security issues. As such, its involvement in the regional apparatus is essential to contribute to the improvement of the situation in the region. As Mali was considered in a fairly recent past as the soft belly of the Sahel, so much a rise of this country is necessary to stop the spread of the insecurity in the neighboring countries. It should be mentioned that the country is currently heading the presidency of the G5 Sahel.
Sahelien.com: Chad is engaged against Boko Haram and it is also committed in the G5. Can we talk about an over-commitment, given that the country is currently experiencing economic difficulties?
Ibrahim Maïga: Perhaps we should ask the question differently. Can Chad objectively stay away from the situation in the G5 Sahel? If the answer is no, then it is better to welcome the commitment of the States concerned primarily by the crisis in the region. Now, it is possible to question the capacity of States with limited resources to cope with a set of challenges. It is all the interest of a framework of cooperation and sharing as proposed to do the G5 Sahel. It is also to be hoped that the promises made by international partners to support the States of the region will be followed up. But it is good that the main concerned are at the forefront of the problems that affect their populations first.
Sahelien.com: What other strategy must be put in place to fight against terrorism in the Sahel
Ibrahim Maïga: We will never cease to repeat it but the security approach even if it would be useful remains insufficient. It is not possible to solve all the challenges faced by individual governments, which are in reality structural challenges related to how the State manages its territories and the people who inhabit them. At most, it would make it possible to contain or at best weaken these groups. So the only way to overcome this phenomenon is to grasp it in its complexity. That is to say, to work on the causes and not only the consequences.
Remarks collected by Boubacar Sangaré